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Abstract 
This paper presents an experimental study of the random incentive mechanisms which are a 
standard procedure in economic and psychological experiments. Random incentive 
mechanisms have several advantages but are incentive-compatible only if responses to the 
single tasks are independent. This is true if either the independence axiom of expected utility 
theory or the isolation hypothesis of prospect theory holds. We present a simple test of 
isolation in the context of choice under risk. In the baseline (one task) treatment, we observe 
risk behavior in a given decision problem. We show that by adding an asymmetrically 
dominated choice problem in a random incentive mechanism risk behavior can be 
manipulated systematically; this violates the isolation hypothesis. The random incentive 
mechanism thus does not elicit true preferences in our example.    
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1 Introduction 
Under a random incentive mechanism (RIM) subjects usually respond to numerous tasks (e.g. 
different binary choice questions, bidding for an object in several rounds, etc.) and at the end 
of the experiment one of the tasks is randomly selected and played out for real. RIM is 
thought to provide incentives for responding to all tasks while only paying one of them. This 
reduces expenditures for experimental studies, controls for wealth effects from paying all 
choices sequentially during the experiment as well as portfolio effects from paying all 
decisions at the end of the experiment. These appealing features account for the widespread 
use of RIM in many experimental studies in psychology (e.g. [1], [2]) and economics (e.g. [3] 
- [5]). 
However, it was pointed out by Holt [6] for binary choice between lotteries that RIM is not 
necessarily incentive compatible. If the reduction of compound lotteries axiom holds, RIM 
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provides incentives for truthful revelation of preferences only for preferences that satisfy the 
independence axiom. Since there exists abundant evidence that independence is often 
violated, the argument of Holt seriously challenges RIM. This has motivated several 
experimental studies aiming to test whether RIM elicits true preferences [7] – [16]. Most of 
these studies did not observe serious distortions induced by the use of RIM. One possible 
reason for this result is the isolation hypothesis from prospect theory [17] which implies that 
subjects evaluate each task in a RIM independently of the other tasks.     
 
This note presents a simple experiment designed to test isolation and incentive compatibility 
of RIM in the presence of asymmetrically dominated choice problems. The literature of 
context-dependent choice has shown that adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives in the 
set of options can systematically influence choice behavior [18] – [21]. In contrast to these 
studies, in the present experiment asymmetrically dominated alternatives are not included in 
the set of options in a given task, but they are included in a RIM as additional, independent 
tasks. If isolation holds, choice behavior under RIM in one task should not be influenced by 
the presence of another task even if preferences are menu-dependent. Asymmetrically 
dominated choice problems are understood as follows: Suppose there is a choice between a 
safe lottery S and a risky lottery R. Then a second choice problem, consisting of a safe 
alternative S’ and a risky one R’, risky-dominates the first problem if R’ dominates R and S’ 
is dominated by S. Analogously, a third problem, consisting of a safe alternative S’’ and a 
risky one R’’, safely-dominates the first one if S’’ dominates S and R’’ is dominated by R. 
Our hypothesis is that, in the presence of a risky-dominating choice problem, alternative R (S) 
looks less (more) attractive, leading to a higher fraction of S choices. The opposite is expected 
to hold in the presence of a safely-dominating choice problem. 
 
2 Method 
Two experiments were run at the University of Kiel with altogether 581 subjects. Subjects 
gave written consent to participate in the study. As there was no possibility to lose money in 
the experiments, approval of an ethics committee was neither required nor obtained. In both 
experiments subjects were randomly assigned to one of five groups, referred to as Groups 1, 
2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 3.2 in the sequel. For Experiment 1 the stimuli received by subjects are 
presented in Table 1; each decision was printed on a single sheet of paper. 
 
In Group 1 subjects had just to choose between Options A and B. Subjects were told that 
everybody would receive the payoff (according to the chosen option) in cash directly after the 
experiment and that the payoff of Option B would be determined by a coin flip. In Groups 2.1 
and 3.1 there were two choice problems (presented in the order of Table 1) and a RIM was 
implemented, i.e. there was a first coin flip which determined whether the first or the second 
choice problem was played out for real and a second coin flip which determined the payoff if 
one of the risky options (B, D, or F) were chosen. Group 2.2 (3.2) differed from Group 2.1 
(3.1) only by the order in which the choices were presented: the choice between Options A 
and B was presented first in Groups 2.2 and 3.2. In all groups, the left-right positioning of 
options was randomized. Design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with 
the only exception that the payoff of all safe options (i.e. Options A, C, and E) was increased 
by one Euro.   
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
First 
Choice 
Option A: 4 € with 100% 
Option B: 10 € with 50% 
                   0 € with 50% 
Option C: 3 € with 100% 
Option D: 12 € with 50% 
                   0 € with 50% 
Option E: 5 € with 100% 
Option F: 8 € with 50% 
                  0 € with 50% 
Second 
Choice 
 
Option A: 4 € with 100% 
Option B: 10 € with 50% 
                   0 € with 50% 
Option A: 4 € with 100% 
Option B: 10 € with 50% 
                   0 € with 50% 
 
Table 1: Design of Experiment 1 
 
The aim of Group 1 is to elicit true preferences of subjects between Options A and B as a 
design with one choice problem played out for real offers perfect incentives to reveal true 
preferences [22]. In Groups 2 (3) we also elicit preferences between Options A and B, but the 
choice could however be biased as the design here involves additionally a risky-dominating 
(safely-dominating) choice problem. If the isolation hypothesis holds, the fraction of subjects 
choosing A should be identical in Groups 1, 2, and 3. If isolation is violated, the additional 
choice problem in Groups 2 and 3 may influence the choice between A and B. In Group 2, 
Option A dominates Option C whereas B is dominated by D. Analogous to the evidence of 
asymmetrically dominated alternatives in the context-dependent choice experiments this could 
make Option A look more attractive and Option B less attractive, leading to a higher fraction 
of A choices compared to Group 1. The opposite is expected for Group 3 as here A is 
dominated by E whereas B dominates F. Comparing the fraction of B choices in Groups 2 and 
3 with those in Group 1 provides a simple and direct test of isolation. In addition, in Groups 2 
and 3 we observe choices between A and B embedded in RIM with reverse asymmetrically 
choice problems. Therefore, comparing the fraction of B choices Groups 2 and 3 provides a 
test on the incentive compatibility of RIM.   
 
3 Results 
The results of both experiments for all groups and all choice problems are presented in Table 
2; reported figures correspond to the fraction of subjects choosing the risky lottery. First, we 
can see that in Groups 2.1 and 2.2 indeed by far most subjects choose the risky option D. 
These subjects thus may be reluctant to choose B leading to a lower fraction of observed B 
choices as compared to Group 1. In Groups 3.1 and 3.2 we observe most subjects choosing 
the safe option E, so we expect A to look less attractive. 
 
Group 1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 
Experiment 1 
N 58 54 54 62 56 
% Choice of B 82.8 51.9 59.3 80.6 78.6 
% Choice of D (F)  88.9 96.3 12.9   3.6 
Experiment 2 
N 61 62 59 57 58 
% Choice of B 31.1 29.0 33.9 52.6** 43.1 
% Choice of D (F)  87.1 93.2   7.0   5.2 
 
Table 2: Results 
 
Let us first look at Experiment 1. The differences between choices of B in the single groups 
are presented in Table 3 along with tests according to the test-statistics of Conlisk [23]. All 
tests are two-sided and *** (**, *) refers to a significance-level of 1% (5%, 10%). While 
82.8% of subjects chose B in Group 1, this fraction reduces to 51.9% and 59.3% in Groups 
2.1 and 2.2 respectively. In both cases, the difference is significant. As expected, A turns out 
to be more attractive in Groups 2 leading to a significant violation of isolation and, therefore, 
to a failure of isolation. In Group 3 we have hypothesized the opposite effect (of Group 2) but 
the fraction of B choices is not significantly higher than in Group 1. This may be due to a 
ceiling effect, as a large fraction of subjects prefer B over A anyhow. There are also in each 
case significant differences between the choice of the risky option in Groups 2 and 3. This 
shows that the choice behavior in a RIM depends strongly on the other tasks involved. All 
four tests of the RIM (i.e. 2.1 vs. 3.1, 2.1 vs. 3.2, 2.2 vs. 3.1, and 2.2 vs. 3.2) lead to the 
conclusion that choice behavior is significantly different across groups. Therefore, RIM is not 
incentive-compatible in our experiment. 
 
Data also reveal ordering effects between Groups 2.1 and 2.2 as well as between Groups 3.1 
and 3.2; such effects are all in the expected direction, i.e. the choice behavior between A and 
B is less affected when this choice is presented first. However, these effects are insignificant. 
The relatively small ordering effects can be explained by the fact that in the instructions to 
Groups 2 and 3 all alternatives were presented prior to the response of subjects.       
 
 Group 1 Group 2.1 Group 2.2 Group 3.1 Group 3.2 
Group 1 -     
Group 2.1 30.9*** -    
Group 2.2 23.5** -8.3 -   
Group 3.1 2.2 -28.7*** -21.3** -  
Group 3.2 -4.2 -26.7*** -19.3** 2.0 - 
 
Table 3: Differences in the Choice of B in Experiment 1 
 
Table 4 reports the differences of fractions of B choices in the single groups for Experiment 2. 
Here, in contrast to Experiment 1 we do not observe significant differences between Group 1 
and Groups 2 but now the differences between Group 1 and Groups 3 turn out to be 
significant; the isolation hypothesis is again violated. Also between Groups 2 and 3 in three 
out of four cases responses are significantly different which shows that RIM is not incentive 
compatible.    
 
 Group 1 Group 2.1 Group 2.2 Group 3.1 Group 3.2 
Group 1 -     
Group 2.1 2.1 -    
Group 2.2 -2.8 -4.9 -   
Group 3.1 -21.5*** -23.6*** -18.7** -  
Group 3.2 -12.0* -14.1*** -9.2 9.5 - 
 
Table 4: Differences in the Choice of B in Experiment 2 
 
4 Discussion 
This note has shown with a very simple experimental design that the use of asymmetrically 
dominated alternatives in a random incentive mechanism can manipulate choice behavior 
systematically. In our study isolation is violated significantly and RIM does not elicit true 
preferences. We ran eight tests of isolation (fraction of B choices in Group 1 versus the other 
four groups in two experiments) and observed a significant violation in four cases. This is 
rather clear-cut and not mixed evidence because isolation cannot be used to justify the use of 
RIM unless it holds generally; holding 50 percent of the time clearly will not do. Additionally, 
we ran eight tests of the incentive-compatibility of RIM (fraction of B choices in Groups 2 
versus Groups 3 in two experiments) and in seven out of these eight tests responses were 
significantly different. We conclude that our data show that: (i) choice behavior in RIM 
depends substantially on the other tasks involved, and (ii) the effect of asymmetrically 
dominated alternatives is consistent with the hypothesized direction.  
 
Altogether, the presented results demonstrate that a common methodology in experimental 
studies, RIM may induce distortions. Further research is needed in order to investigate how 
serious these distortions are in practice.   
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